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Approach and Avoidance During
Routine Behavior and During
Surprise in a Non-evaluative Task:
Surprise Matters and So Does the
Valence of the Surprising Event
Achim Schützwohl*
Department of Life Sciences, Brunel University London, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
The hypothesis that emotions influence our behavior via emotional action tendencies is
at the core of many emotion theories. According to a strong version of this hypothesis,
these emotional action tendencies are immediate, automatic (unintentional), stimulus-
based and directly linked with specific muscle movements. Recent evidence, however,
provides little empirical support for this strong version during routine behavior, especially
when the task does not require the evaluation of the stimuli. The present study
tested the prediction that surprise interrupts routine behavior and triggers a threat
avoidance response. In the presence of a threat-related stimulus, avoidance responses
are relatively rapid, and approach responses impeded, even when the interrupted routine
behavior is guided by a non-evaluative task goal. In contrast, approach and avoidance
responses are predicted to be unaffected in the presence of a pleasant surprising
stimulus. To test these predictions, in each trial the participants had to execute an
approach or withdrawal movement depending on the location of a target stimulus. In
the critical trial, either a picture of a pleasant or a threat-related animal was presented
as target. Supporting the predictions, the initiation times for these movements were
shorter in response to a threat-relevant than a pleasant surprising stimulus. Additionally,
in the presence of a threat-related surprising stimulus, withdrawal movements were
made faster than approach movements even though the participants performed a
non-evaluative task. Implications and limitations of the present study are discussed.
Keywords: emotion, surprise, evolutionary psychology, action tendency, routine behavior
INTRODUCTION
A common assumption of evolutionary emotion theories is that emotions are linked to specific
action tendencies (e.g., McDougall, 1908/1960; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1996). Specifically, these
theories hypothesize that positively valenced stimuli trigger approach action tendencies whereas
negatively valenced stimuli evoke avoidance action tendencies (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Bradley et al.,
2001). These emotional action tendencies have presumably evolved because they facilitate the
rapid approach to benign stimuli, and the rapid avoidance of harmful or threatening stimuli.
According to a strong version of this hypothesis, these emotional action tendencies are immediate,
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automatic (unintentional), stimulus-based and directly linked
with specific muscle movements (e.g., arm flexion is directly
linked to affectively positive stimuli and arm extension directly
linked to affectively negative stimuli; Solarz, 1960; Chen and
Bargh, 1999).
However, two recent meta-analyses of studies that empirically
tested this strong hypothesis came to the conclusion that it is
currently not well supported (Phaf et al., 2014; Laham et al.,
2015). Phaf et al. (2014) reported a significant compatibility
effect between stimulus valence and approach and avoidance
movements (i.e., faster approach responses in the presence of a
positive than negative stimulus and faster avoidance responses
in the presence of a negative than positive stimulus) only if the
task required an explicit evaluation of the affective valence of
the stimuli. However, in implicit tasks where the stimuli were
to be categorized according to non-evaluative features such as
the gender of faces shown or the grammatical status of words
(e.g., Rotteveel and Phaf, 2004; Krieglmeyer and Deutsch, 2010;
Krieglmeyer et al., 2010), no significant compatibility effect
was found. Based on these results, Phaf et al. (2014, p. 14)
concluded that the available data “argue against an immediate,
unintentional, implicit, stimulus-based, and evolutionary-based
or automatized link between affect and approach and avoidance.”
It is important to note, however, that the lack of empirical support
for the strong version of the hypothesis does not refute the
assumption that emotional action tendencies have evolved to
support the execution of approach and avoidance behavior.
Based on a larger sample of empirical studies due to more
relaxed inclusion criteria Laham et al. (2015, p. 1082) found in
their meta-analysis an “in all likelihood not larger than a small
(compatibility) effect.” Although their meta-analysis revealed
significant effects for both explicit and implicit evaluations tasks,
consistent with Phaf et al. (2014), this small compatibility effect
was even smaller for implicit than explicit evaluation tasks.
In addition, Laham et al. (2015) also found larger compatibility
effects for human faces than for words or pictorial stimuli
and for negative stimuli which were anger-related, which might
indicate that these stimuli have higher ecological significance and
are evolutionarily prepared to link to specific motor responses.
Importantly, effect sizes were also significantly larger if the
affective valence of a stimulus matched the explicit response labels
that framed muscle movements as either positive or negative,
irrespective of the type of muscle movement (e.g., arm flexion or
extension). To illustrate, both flexion and extension movements
in the presence of a positive stimulus were found to be made
faster if these movements were positively framed as for example
“toward,” “upward,” or “approach” than negatively as “away
from,” downward,” or “avoid.”
This result obviously is not only incompatible with the strong
version hypothesis of an automatic link between the affective
valence of a stimulus and specific muscle movements (e.g.,
positive – flexion; negative – extension; Solarz, 1960; Chen and
Bargh, 1999). It is also inconsistent with a second theoretical
account of emotional action tendencies according to which these
action tendencies regulate the distance between the affective
stimulus and the actor (i.e., reduce the distance if the stimulus
is positive and increase the distance if the stimulus is negative;
e.g., Markman and Brendl, 2005) as flexion movements framed
as positive in the presence of a positive stimulus actually increase
the distance between the positive stimulus and the actor. Rather,
this compatibility effect between the valence of the stimulus
and the valence of the explicit response labels best supports
a third theoretical account of emotional action tendencies, the
evaluative coding account (Lavender and Hommel, 2007; Eder
and Rothermund, 2008).
The evaluative coding account argues that both flexion and
extension movements are facilitated in the presence of a positive
stimulus if these movements are positively framed as “toward,”
“upward,” or “approach” than negatively framed as “away from,”
downward,” or “avoid” because of a match or overlap between
the code representing the valence of the stimulus and the code
representing the valence of the response label and this facilitative
effect is assumed to be independent of distance regulation.
It is possible, however, that the lack of empirical support
for the strong version of the evolutionary link between
positive and negative affect and approach and avoidance
responses, respectively, in the studies reviewed by Phaf et al.
(2014) and Laham et al. (2015) was due to limitations of
the research designs used, which were motivated by a too
broadly conceptualized version of the emotion-action link. In
the typical study, affective compatibility effects were tested
(1) in a within-subjects design where the same participants
responded with approach and avoidance to both positively and
negatively valenced stimuli (2) during routine behavior (3)
across a large number of rather uniform trials. In nearly all
studies, furthermore, (4) the participants were either asked to
indicate the affective valence of the stimuli, or to categorize
the stimuli according to non-evaluative features such as the
gender of faces shown, thus forcing participants to process and
categorize certain inherent features of the stimuli (e.g., Rotteveel
and Phaf, 2004; Krieglmeyer and Deutsch, 2010; Krieglmeyer
et al., 2010). Moreover, (5) the negatively valenced stimuli
used are typically not restricted to phylogenetically relevant
objects with high ecological significance. Finally, (6) explicit
response labels typically framed the movements as either positive
or negative, allowing participants to employ a rather general
mechanism of perception and action planning in the course of
the experiment, that is not restricted to affective stimuli-response
compatibility effects but also underlies non-affective stimulus-
response compatibility effects based on for example the color,
location or shape of stimuli (Theory of Event Coding: Hommel
et al., 2001).
A more specific version of the evolutionary emotion-action
hypothesis, however, may still be viable. This more restricted
version predicts that automatic emotional action tendencies are
elicited even if no evaluation or categorization of the stimuli is
required in those cases where routine behavior is inappropriate
to guide behavior. One such case is when the surprise mechanism
gets activated. Thus, the present study takes a new theoretical
and experimental approach to testing the automatic link between
the affective valence of a stimulus and the ensuing approach
or avoidance response based on a cognitive-evolutionary (CE)
model of surprise developed by Meyer and colleagues (e.g.,
Meyer, 1988; Meyer et al., 1991, 1994, 1997; Schützwohl, 2009;
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Reisenzein et al., 2017). To achieve this goal, the present study
examines approach and avoidance responses (1) in a between-
subjects design while (2) a positive or negative unexpected
stimulus interrupts routine behavior (3) in a single trial (4)
using a task that does not require the analysis of any of the
inherent features of the stimuli where (5) the negative stimulus




The CE model of surprise assumes that surprise is a (generally)
adaptive, evolutionary-based mechanism that is elicited by
discrepancies between current input and cognitive schemata. The
surprise mechanism interrupts ongoing activities and enables
and motivates processes that serve to analyze and cope with the
schema-discrepant event, and, eventually, to remove the schema-
input discrepancy (Meyer et al., 1994, 1997).
The present study is concerned with the evaluation of the
schema-discrepant event’s implications for the individual’s well-
being. In early versions of the CE surprise model, this evaluation
was conceived of as an unbiased appraisal process determining
whether the implications for the individual’s well-being are
benign, negative/harmful or neutral. However, Schützwohl and
Borgstedt (2005) argued that this appraisal process might not be
as unbiased as previously thought. Instead, they proposed that the
appraisal of well-being of the unexpected stimulus is geared to the
rapid detection and preferential processing of possible impending
harm or threat. This proposal was based on the assumptions that
(a) surprising events were undoubtedly often dangerous during
our evolutionary history (see already Darwin, 1872/1965, p. 222)
and (b) the failure to quickly detect and preferentially process
unexpected harm or threat presumably entails greater costs in
the long run than the failure to quickly recognize unexpected
benefits.
Support for the hypothesis that the appraisal of unexpected
events prioritizes the detection of threat was obtained by
Schützwohl and Borgstedt (2005; Study 2). In each trial of
this experiment, two pictures were presented simultaneously.
Depending on experimental condition, the participants had to
decide whether at least one of the two pictures depicted either
a pleasant or a threat-related stimulus. In a critical trial, pictures
of both a pleasant and a threat-related animal appeared. These
pictures were preceded by either a familiar or a novel, unexpected
cue stimulus that elicited surprise. Response times indicated that
during routine behavior (familiar stimulus), the pleasant animal
was detected faster than the threat-related animal. In contrast,
in the context of a surprising event, the threat-related animal
was detected more reliably and faster than the pleasant animal.
Additional empirical support for the hypothesis that the appraisal
of unexpected event is biased toward the detection of threat
was reported by Browning and Harmer (2012), who found that
surprise increased the attention to potentially threatening faces.
Finally, Topolinski and Strack (2015) recently reported that the
immediate affect in surprise is negative which is also compatible
with the assumption that the surprise mechanism prioritizes the
detection of threatening stimuli.
The present study extends this line of research. This extension
was based on the idea that the evolutionary strategy of coping
with unexpected, potentially harmful events comprises not
only the prioritized detection of threat but also an immediate
avoidance response. This avoidance response is assumed to be
independent of the affective valence and the task relevance
of the schema-discrepant event and to facilitate withdrawal
movements and to impede approach movements to threat-
related stimuli. In support of this hypothesis, Herry et al. (2007)
found that unpredictable stimuli induced avoidance behavior.
Empirical support for this assumption can also be derived from
the potentiation of the startle reflex (indicating an avoidance
response) during unpredictable events (e.g., Grillon et al., 2006).
In contrast, the detection that the surprising stimulus is neutral
or benign indicates that an avoidance response would be
inappropriate. I therefore predict that under these circumstances
the prepared avoidance response is deactivated and thus has no
effects on approach or withdrawal responses.
The objective of the present study is to provide an empirical
test of the hypothesis that the surprise mechanism automatically
triggers an avoidance response that is irrespective of the affective
valence and the task relevance of the schema-discrepant stimulus.
To test this assumption, a novel experimental procedure was
developed: In each trial of the experiment, a target stimulus was
presented either at the right or the left boarder of a computer
screen. At the beginning of each trial, similar to Lavender and
Hommel’s (2007) experimental set-up, the participants’ hand
rested at the “home” plate, and the participants were asked
to move it as quickly as possible to the left or right response
plate depending on whether the stimulus appeared at the left
or right boarder of the screen. For participants in the approach
condition, the direction of the requested hand movement from
the home plate to the response plates was toward the screen,
which reduced the distance between them and the stimulus. The
participants in the avoidance condition had to move their hand
away from the screen, which increased the distance between them
and the stimulus. This procedure allows separating the response
times into an initiation time (the interval from the beginning of
the target presentation until the participant lifts the hand from
the home plate) and a movement time (the interval from the
initiation of the response until the participant places the hand on
the response plate).
To emphasize the non-evaluative nature of the task the targets
in Trials 1 – 40 of the experimental group were lacking any
affective valence as they consisted of bright squares presented
against a black background. In contrast, in the critical Trial 41,
a color photograph showing either a pleasant animal (a baby
monkey) or a phylogenetically threat-related animal (a spider)
appeared instead of the bright square. This stimulus change was
intended to elicit surprise. In the control condition, the critical
trial was identical to that in the experimental condition, but the
presentation of the animal pictures was not surprising, because
five pleasant and five threat-related animal pictures had already
been presented during the preceding trials. These “animal picture
trials” were interspersed with the bright square trials.
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The following six predictions were tested: The presentation
of the animal picture in the critical trial elicits surprise feelings
in the experimental but not in the control condition. Initiation
times in the critical trial are longer in the experimental than
control condition, due to the interruption of ongoing activities
caused by the surprise mechanism in the experimental condition.
Initiation times in the critical trial are shorter in the presence of
a surprising threat-related than a surprising pleasant stimulus,
irrespective of the requested movement. In the presence of
a surprising threat-related stimulus, the requested withdrawal
movement times in the critical trial are shorter than the requested
approach movement times. In the presence of a surprising
pleasant stimulus, the requested withdrawal movement times
in the critical trial do not differ from the requested approach
movement times. Finally, both the initiation and movement times
of the requested response in the control condition — i.e., during
routine behavior, where the affective valence of the target stimuli
is clearly task-irrelevant — are unaffected by the affective valence
of the pictures in the critical trial.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The participants were 59 female and 40 male students. The female
participants’ mean age was 24.8 years (SD = 4.9) and the male
participants’ mean age was 24.6 years (SD = 3.0). They were
recruited at the public places of the university and were not paid
for their participation.
Apparatus
The stimuli were presented on a 15” VGA monitor controlled
by an IBM-compatible personal computer. The participants’
responses were recorded using three sensor plates that were
mounted on a rectangular 35 cm × 25 cm plastic board (see
Figure 1). The home plate was mounted at one end of the plastic
board; its size was 12.8 cm × 7.6 cm. The two response plates
were mounted side by side at the opposite end of the board;
their size was 7.6 cm × 7.6 cm each. The distance between the
two response plates was 1.6 cm and the distance between the
home plate and a response plate was 11.6 cm. Reaction time
(RT) measurement started with the presentation of the stimulus.
When the participants’ hand left the home plate, an electric
circuit was interrupted that caused the computer to register the
initiation time. When the hand touched one of the response
plates, another electric circuit was closed and the computer
registered the movement time.
Stimuli
Each trial started with the display of a bright arrow against a
dark background for 150 ms at the center of the screen. The
length of the arrow was 2.6 cm and it pointed either to the right
or to the left. 400 ms after its disappearance, a target stimulus
was presented either on the left or the right half of the screen.
In the experimental condition, the target in Trials 1 – 40 was a
bright square presented against a dark background. Four different
sizes of squares measuring 0.5, 1, 2, and 4 cm, respectively, were
FIGURE 1 | The response board.
used. In the control condition, five pleasant and five threat-
related “animal trials” were randomly interspersed between 30
bright square trials during the first 40 trials. The pictures of the
five pleasant animals showed a duckling, a hedgehog, a koala, a
ground squirrel, and a penguin; the five threat-related animals
shown were a scorpion, a bat, a snake, a hyena, and a wasp. In
Trial 41, the critical trial, the target stimulus in both experimental
conditions was either the picture of a pleasant baby monkey or
of a threat-related spider. The color of both animals shown in the
critical trial was of a similar brown. The size of the animal pictures
was 8.0 cm × 7.7 cm.
In the experimental condition, each square size appeared
equally often in Trials 1 – 40 in a fixed random order. In the
control condition, the animal pictures always replaced the largest
square. The center of the target stimulus was constant at 7.0 cm
to the right or to the left of the center of the screen. The target
stimulus disappeared when the hand was placed on one of the
response plates or after 5,000 ms if no response had occurred until
then. The next trial started 1,500 ms after the hand had returned
to the home plate or – if no response had occurred within 5,000–
1,500 ms after the target stimulus had disappeared. The sequence
of events in a given trial is shown in Figure 2.
During Trials 1–40, the arrow was valid in 80% of the cases
(i.e., it pointed at the correct location of the target stimulus). In
the critical trial, the arrow was valid for half of the participants
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FIGURE 2 | The sequence of events in a given trial.
and invalid for the other half. Cue validity was introduced to
prevent response initiation in response to the arrow, that is prior
to the presentation of the target. In addition, the target in the
critical trial appeared approximately equally often to the left and
to the right of the screen center.
Procedure and Instructions
The participants were tested individually in a dimly lit laboratory
room. They were seated at a table approximately 50 cm from
the computer monitor. The female experimenter remained in the
room during the experiment so that she could answer questions
that might come up during the experiment, especially in the
critical trial in the experimental group. She sat at a table located
behind the participant and oriented 90 degrees away, busying
herself with some paper work.
The plastic board containing the sensor plates was located
on the table approximately midway between the monitor and
the participants. The experimenter provided verbal instructions
describing the stimuli, the task and the validity of the arrow.
Instructions were identical in the both movement conditions
and only referred to the movement from the home plate to the
response plate. Thus, no affective response labels were provided.
The participants were instructed to place their right hand on the
home plate and to move it as quickly as possible from the home
plate to the response plates when the target stimulus appeared
(depending on its location to the left or the right plate), and then
to return the hand to the home plate. The participants in the
control condition were additionally informed that in some trials,
the target stimulus would be an animal picture. According to
the event coding account (Hommel et al., 2001), action planning
during routine behavior should be fairly easy because of the
overlap of the location of the stimulus and the location of the
response plate.
For participants with a requested approach reaction, the home
and the response plates were arranged in such a way that the
initial movement was toward the target; for participants with a
requested withdrawal reaction, the initial movement was away
from the target. This was accomplished by simply turning the
plastic board by 180◦. Thus, the approach movement started close
to the participant and ended immediately in front of the screen,
whereas the withdrawal movement started in front of the screen
and ended close to the participant. Note that the instructions in
the experimental condition referred to affectively neutral stimuli
(bright squares of different sizes) and the requested movements
were described without using any affectively valenced words, but
only described the movements as from the home plate to the
response plate, irrespective of the requested direction.
Ten practice trials were followed by 41 experimental trials.
Immediately after the critical Trial 41, the participants were first
asked whether they were surprised by the presentation of the
animal picture in the last trial and, if yes, to indicate the intensity
of their surprise feeling on an 11-point rating scale ranging from
0 (not at all surprised) to 10 (as surprised as one can possibly be).
Design
The experimental design was a 2 (condition: experimental vs.
control) × 2 (target valence: pleasant vs. threat-related) × 2
(requested movement: approach vs. withdrawal) × 2 (arrow
validity: valid vs. invalid) between-subjects factorial design.
The participants were randomly assigned to one of the 16
groups resulting from the combination of the four factors,
with approximately twice as many participants assigned to the
experimental than to the control condition.
RESULTS
Surprise Feelings
As predicted, all but one participant in the experimental
condition but only two control participants (one each in the
pleasant and threat-related control group) reported that s/he
was surprised by the presentation of the animal picture in the
critical trial. Therefore, only the surprise ratings obtained from
the experimental participants were analyzed further.
The mean surprise rating in the experimental condition was
7.06, indicating that the presentation of the target animal in the
critical trial elicited considerable surprise. A two-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) of the surprise ratings, with target valence
(pleasant vs. threat-related) and requested movement (approach
vs. withdrawal) as between-subjects factors, revealed that the
surprise ratings were influenced by the direction of the requested
movement, F(1,64) = 7.36, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.103. Inspection of the
means revealed that participants requested to approach the target
reported higher surprise (7.81) than those requested to withdraw
from the target (6.39). The main effect of target valence and the
interaction were not significant, Fs < 1.
Reaction Times
As mentioned earlier, the measurement procedure used in the
present experiment allowed to separate the response times into
an initiation time (the interval from the beginning of the target
presentation until the participant lifted the hand from the home
plate) and a movement time (the interval from the initiation of
the response until the participant placed the hand on the response
plate). These two RTs were separately analyzed. Table 1 shows
the mean initiation and movement times in the critical trials
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TABLE 1 | Mean initiation and movement times in milliseconds (SDs in
parentheses) as a function of condition, target valence, and requested movement.
Pleasant target Threat-related target
Approach Withdraw Approach Withdraw
Experimental
Initiation 479 (183) 567 (389) 452 (273) 408 (224)
Movement 358 (184) 370 (229) 800 (629) 256 (134)
Control
Initiation 309 (99) 248 (46) 297 (66) 263 (72)
Movement 211 (56) 196 (80) 184 (48) 241 (81)
as a function of the condition, target valence and the requested
movement.
Initiation Times in the Critical Trial
A four-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of the initiation
times in the critical trial with condition, target valence, requested
movement and arrow validity (valid vs. invalid) as the between
subjects factors and the baseline initiation time (the mean
initiation time in the ten trials preceding the critical trial) as
the covariate yielded a significant main effect of condition,
F(1,82) = 19.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.195. As predicted, initiation
times were significantly longer in the experimental than in
the control condition (477 ms vs. 279 ms). Although the
predicted interaction between condition and target valence was
not significant and thus was not as robustly supported by the
data as it could have been, F(1,82), = 2.28, p = 0.135, η2p = 0.027,
the ANCOVA was repeated separately for the two conditions
in order to directly test the prediction that the initiation times
are shorter in the presence of a surprising threat-related than
a surprising pleasant stimulus. Supporting this prediction, the
main effect for valence was significant in the experimental
condition, F(1,58) = 4.91, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.078, reflecting shorter
initiation times for the threat-related than the pleasant target
stimulus (428 ms vs. 525 ms). In contrast, the same ANCOVA
in the control condition revealed no significant main effect for
valence, F(1,23) = 0.02. The remaining main and interaction
effects were also not significant, Fs (1,58) < 3.19, ps > 0.08, in
the experimental condition, and Fs (1,23) < 2.86, ps > 0.10, in
the control condition. The remaining main and interaction effects
of the initial ANCOVA were not significant, Fs (1,82) < 1.90,
ps > 0.17.
Movement Times in the Critical Trial
The movement times of two experimental participants
(approach/threat-related and withdrawal/pleasant, respectively)
exceeded their group mean movement times by more than
three standard deviations. Their movement times were replaced
by their respective group means (Ratcliff, 1993; Öhman et al.,
2001). The four-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of the
movement times in the critical trial with condition, target valence,
requested movement and arrow validity (valid vs. invalid) as the
between subjects factors and the baseline movement times (the
mean movement times in the ten trials preceding the critical
trial) as the covariate yielded the predicted results. The main
effect for condition was significant, F(1,82) = 11.94, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.127, showing that movement times were longer in the
experimental than in the control condition (433 ms vs. 208 ms).
The main effect for the requested movement was marginally
significant, F(1,82) = 3.76, p = 0.056, η2p = 0.044. In addition, the
significant two-way interaction between condition and requested
movement, F(1,82) = 4.98, p = 0.028, η2p = 0.057, as well as
the marginally significant two-way interaction between target
valence and requested movement, F(1,82) = 3.32, p = 0.072,
η2p = 0.039, were modified by a significant three-way interaction
between condition, target valence and requested movement,
F(1,90) = 6.30, p = 0.014, η2p = 0.071. The remaining main and
interaction effects were not reliable, Fs < 2.
The significant three-way interaction was followed up
with separate two-way between-subjects ANCOVAs for the
experimental and control condition. For the control condition,
this ANCOVA revealed no significant main effects, Fs < 1, but
an unpredicted marginally significant interaction between target
valence and requested movement, F(1,23) = 4.26, p = 0.051,
η2p = 0.156, indicating that approach movements were slower
than withdrawal movements for the pleasant target (211 ms vs.
196 ms) but faster than withdrawal movements for the threat-
related target (184 ms vs. 241 ms). Subsequent t-tests, however,
revealed no significant differences between any of the mean
movement times involved in this interaction, ts < 1.72, ps > 0.10.
In the experimental condition, the two-way interaction
between target valence and requested movement was also
significant, F(1,58) = 10.36, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.152, thus modifying
the significant main effects of the requested movement,
F(1,58) = 9.55, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.141, as well as the
marginally significant main effect of target valence, F(1,58) = 3.78,
p = 0.057, η2p = 0.061. The mean movement times underlying
this interaction are shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, the
findings confirmed the prediction: The withdrawal movements
were significantly faster than the approach movements in the
presence of the threat-related target (257 ms vs. 800 ms), t(15,
corrected) = −3.29, p = 0.005, d = 1.19. In contrast, withdrawal
and approach movements times for the pleasant target did not
significantly differ (370 ms vs. 358 ms), t(32) = 0.16.
Finally, the movement times were significantly longer in each
of the experimental than their respective control groups, ts > 2,
ps < 0.05, with the exception of the threat-related target with a
requested withdrawal movement groups, t < 0.4.
DISCUSSION
The results of the experiment confirmed most of the predictions.
As intended, the presentation of an animal picture in the critical
trial elicited strong feelings of surprise in the experimental but
not in the control condition. Additionally, the participants in the
experimental condition requested to approach the target reported
more intense surprise than those requested to withdraw from
the target. A possible explanation of this finding is that the
experience of a conflict between the requested movement, and
the avoidance tendency triggered by the surprise mechanisms,
may have contributed to the intensity of the surprise feeling by
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FIGURE 3 | Mean movement times in milliseconds in the experimental and
control condition for approach and withdrawal reactions in response to
pleasant and threat-related targets.
increasing the feeling of interference. Support for the hypothesis
that the interference with ongoing activities can increase feelings
of surprise has been found in several previous studies (e.g.,
Schützwohl and Krefting, 2001; Reisenzein and Studtmann, 2007;
see Reisenzein et al., 2017).
Confirming the prediction, the initiation times in the critical
trial were longer in the experimental than in the control
condition, reflecting the interruption of ongoing activities caused
by surprise. Additionally, the initiation times in the experimental
condition were significantly shorter if the surprising stimulus
was threat-related than if it was pleasant. However, the reader
should keep in mind that the predicted interaction between
condition and affective valence fell short of the conventional
significance level and the present finding thus offers only
qualified support for this particular prediction. Most importantly,
withdrawal movements given a threat-related surprising stimulus
were significantly faster than approach movements. In contrast,
there were no significant differences between withdrawal and
approach movements if the surprising stimulus was pleasant.
The only disagreement with predictions concerned the
movement times in the control condition: Although, as predicted,
the initiation times in the control condition did not differ as
a function of the requested movement and the valence of the
target, the approach movement time to a pleasant stimulus was
somewhat longer, and that to a threat-related stimulus somewhat
shorter, than the corresponding withdrawal movement times. As
this pattern of findings for the control condition was not only
unpredicted but is also hard to make sense of retrospectively, it
might well be a spurious effect.
Taken together, the present findings in the experimental
condition thus support the assumption of the CE surprise
model, that the surprise mechanism interrupts ongoing activities,
including routine behavior, and replaces them with a tendency
to avoid threat. Furthermore, this was shown to occur even if
the routine behavior was controlled by a non-evaluative task
and in the absence of affective response labels: Irrespective
of the requested movement, the initiation of a response was
faster in the presence of a threat-related than a pleasant
surprising event. Additionally, the execution of a withdrawal
movement from a threat-related surprising event was much
faster than the execution of an approach response toward this
stimulus. In fact, the comparison of the movement times between
the experimental groups and their respective control groups
revealed that the withdrawal from a threat-related stimulus did
not significantly differ between the experimental and control
group, underscoring the urgency of the withdrawal from the
threat-related surprising event. All other comparisons yielded
longer movement times in the experimental groups. These
significant differences in the movement times in the presence
of a pleasant stimulus suggest that the response to a surprising
pleasant event are considered as less urgent, thus allowing
other processes to interfere with the execution of the requested
response. These processes could concern the event analysis
processes typically instigated by surprising events (Reisenzein
et al., 2017). Alternatively, the interruption and resumption
of the routine behavior in the surprise trial might result in
a more voluntary and thus more time-consuming control of
the execution of the requested movement, irrespective of its
direction. In contrast, the substantially prolonged approach
movement times in the presence of the threat-related surprising
event presumably reflect the considerable efforts required to
overcome the conflict between the requested movement and
the withdrawal response automatically triggered by the surprise
mechanism.
The present findings help to further refine the CE model
of surprise proposed by Meyer et al. (1997) and Schützwohl
(2000, 2009): The evidence from the present experiment suggests
that the surprise mechanism not only prioritizes the processing
of threat-related surprising events (Schützwohl and Borgstedt,
2005) but also prepares adaptive behavioral responses in the face
of threat.
Because the preferential processing of threat-related
information and the priming of a withdrawal response shares
central characteristics with the fear mechanism (e.g., LeDoux,
1996), it seems possible that these responses are not part of the
“surprise program” itself, but that surprise activates or recruits
(parts of) the fear mechanism. This explanation, if correct, would
not belittle the importance of the present findings, however.
Rather, it fits well with Tooby and Cosmides’ (2008) evolutionary
approach to emotions, which views emotions as superordinate
programs that activate or recruit those psychological mechanism
that in our ancestors’ past have contributed to the solution
to specific adaptive problems. Unexpected harm or threat
certainly constitutes an important adaptive problem. To solve
this problem, it would be sensible for the surprise mechanisms to
recruit an already existing mechanism specialized in coping with
impending harm or threat. The activation of fear by surprise
would also help explaining why the facial expression of surprise is
similar to the facial expression of fear (e.g., Smith et al., 2005) and
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provides a theoretical account why the initial affect in surprise is
negative (Topolinski and Strack, 2015).
What are the implications of the present data in the
experimental condition for the three theoretical accounts of
emotional action tendencies contrasted in the Introduction. The
faster withdrawal than approach movement times in response
to a surprising threat-related stimulus are incompatible with
the evaluative coding account derived from the more general
event coding account (Hommel et al., 2001) because this account
applies only if both a negative stimulus and a negative response
label are present. However, no affective response labels were
provided. Instead the data provide initial empirical support
of the strong version of an automatic, involuntary, stimulus-
based direct link between a negative surprising stimulus and
an avoidance response. As this avoidance response increases
the distance between stimulus and actor, it is also compatible
with the distance regulation account (e.g., Markman and Brendl,
2005). Further studies will be needed that try to disentangle
the two theoretical accounts. The initiation and movements
times in the control condition are mostly supportive of the
event coding account: During routine behavior, the overlap
between the location of the stimulus and the location of
the response plates allows to use local codes for guiding
behavior.
Certain limitations of the present study suggest directions for
future research. In the present study, the approach movement
consisted of an extension of the arm, which simultaneously
resulted in a decrease of the distance to the target (Lavender and
Hommel, 2007), whereas the avoidance movement consisted of
a flexion of the arm which increased the distance to the target.
These approach and avoidance responses were chosen in the
present study because, as suggested by Schneirla (1959), they
can probably be regarded as the default approach and avoidance
responses in everyday life. Because of this choice of approach
and avoidance responses, however, it is unclear which component
of the response (muscular flexion or extension vs. increase vs.
decrease of the distance to the target) was decisive. It would
be highly interesting to know, however, whether the results
obtained in the present study can be replicated with alternative
operationalizations of approach and withdrawal movements such
as the operationalization used by Rotteveel and Phaf (2004),
who operationalized approach as arm flexion and avoidance as
arm extension in the absence of a change of the spatial distance
between the person and the affective stimuli. This would allow
pinpointing more clearly the nature of the postulated, surprise-
linked evolutionary avoidance tendency.
A second limitation of the present study is that only one
pleasant and one threat-related stimulus was used in the critical
trial. Although the two stimuli used (a baby monkey and a spider)
can be considered prototypes of pleasant and threat-related
stimuli, future studies should use additional target stimuli of each
category to increase the generalizability of the findings. It should
be noted, however, that previous studies that found evidence for
the hypothesis of a threat detection and avoidance component of
the surprise mechanism have already used a variety of pleasant
and threat-related stimuli, including pictures of a squirrel and
a ferocious dog (Schützwohl and Borgstedt, 2005; Study 2) as
well as various animal words (Schützwohl and Borgstedt, 2005;
Study 1).
Finally, future research should test the present predictions in
real life encounters with pleasant and threat-related stimuli in the
context of both routine behavior and a surprising event.
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